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In March 1984, a sharply divided Supreme Court held that the City
of Pawtucket's purchase and public display of a creche at Christmas did
not constitute an establishment of religion, "notwithstanding the reli-
gious significance of the creche."' No longer stressing the importance of
separation between church and state, and the requirement of neutrality
as between religion and nonreligion, the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly em-
phasized governmental accommodation to the majority's religion as a
major theme of the first amendment.2
Lynch was handed down during a period when the activity and in-
fluence of religious groups in the nation's political life reached a level
probably unparalleled since prohibition. Acting for expressly religious
reasons, Fundamentalist Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox
Jews have brought their influence to bear on a wide variety of secular
issues, such as abortion, sex education, criminal justice, and nuclear dis-
armament.3 These groups also have sought direct government involve-
ment in and assistance to religion, such as school prayer and parochiaid.
Some of these groups advocate a shift in the Court's thinking away from
strict separation of church and state. Furthermore, the executive branch
of the federal government supports this objective, making a major altera-
tion in the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence more likely.4
t Professor Dorsen delivered an earlier version of this article at the University of Illinois
College of Law, on March 12, 1985, as the second 1984-85 lecture of the David C. Baum Memorial
Lectures on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights and as the Philip A. Hart Lecture at Georgetown Law
School on March 22, 1985.
Stokes Professor of Law, New York University Law School; President, American Civil Liber-
ties Union (A.CLU). A.B. 1950, Columbia University; LLB. 1953, Harvard Law School; LL.B.
1981, Ripon College Professor Dorsen was one of the counsel for respondents in Lynch v. Donnelly.
•* National Staff Counsel, A.CL U B.A. 1971, Amherst College; J.D. 1976, Yale Law School.
1. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984).
2. Id. at 1360-61.
3. See, e.g., Church, Politics from the Pulpit, TIME, Oct. 13, 1980, at 28; Born Again at the
Ballot Box, TIME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 94; Religious Right Grows and Demands Respect, L.A. Times,
May 15, 1985, at Al, col. 1; Moral Majority and Its Allies Expect Harvest of Votes for Conservatives,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at A38, col. 1; Political and Religious Shifts Rekindle Church-State Issues,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Moral Majority to Step Up Work Against Criminal-Code
Bill, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1981, at All, col. 2.
4. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355
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These efforts caused countervailing political activity by religious groups
and others, and much accompanying fear, suspicion, and strife.' The
1984 presidential election produced religious controversy at a level not
seen since 1960.6
Lynch v. Donnelly is unlikely to reduce the controversy. To the con-
trary, lower courts and governmental units already are enmeshed in post-
Lynch controversies. Is a government-sponsored creche alone, without
the accompanying reindeer and other secular objects present in Lynch,
constitutional?7 Must a city offer public land for privately initiated
creche displays?8 Can governmental displays of crosses or other symbols
pass muster under Lynch?9
These questions arise, as did Lynch itself, at a time when no consen-
sus exists within the Supreme Court or among commentators on the cor-
rect approach to establishment clause doctrine. A host of formulations,
ranging from strict separation to an assertion that this is a "Christian
country", can be gleaned from the cases and other materials.' °
Some observers regarded Lynch v. Donnelly not only as a major de-
(1985); Brief for United States Amicus Curiae, Wallace v.. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). See also
1984 The Republican Platform 33-49; Remarks by President at Prayer Breakfast, N.Y. Times, Aug.
24, 1984, at All, col. 5; Excerpt from President's speech to National Association of Evangelicals,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1983, at A18, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., Swomley, Public Schools Embattled over Prayer, 100 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
681 (July 20-27, 1983); Will, First Amendment Fanatics in Season, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1984, at
108; Bennett Vows Aid to Church Schools, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at AI8, col. 3; Letter from E.
Tarasov, The Danger of Dragging Religion into the Public Arena, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at A22,
col. 4; Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col. 2. A recent
opinion by the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York to the City's Parks Commissioner
recounts the recent controversy in New York over the erection of creches and menorahs in public
places. See Corp. Counsel of City of New York Op. No. 44-84 (Dec. 12, 1984) (copy on file at
University of Illinois Law Review office).
6. As Paul Freund has observed, in 1960 John F. Kennedy quieted fears of Protestants and
others by stating that the Constitution barred federal aid to parochial education. Freund, Public Aid
to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1966). There was no such presidential quieting
effort in 1984.
7. Burelle v. City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.H. 1984); American Civil Liberties
Union v. City of Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (appeal pending Sixth Circuit).
For surveys of post-Lynch developments through early 1985, see AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS,
AFTER PAWTUCKET: RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC LAND (1985); Goodman, The Season of
Peace Brings New Battles Over Nativity Scenes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1985, at Al0, col. 1.
8. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Board of Trustees of Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985); Corp. Counsel
of the City of New York Op., supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalllo County, No. 82-1064 (10th
Cir. Dec. 27, 1984), rev'd en banc (Dec. 26, 1985) (both opinions available on LEXIS and copies on
file at University of Illinois Law Review office); Libin v. Town of Greenwich, Civ. No. B-84-805 (D.
Conn. Dec. 10, 1985) (order granting preliminary injunction) (available on LEXIS and copy on file
at University of Illinois Law Review office); American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. City of St.
Charles, No. 85-C-09917 (N.D. I1. Dec. 5, 1985) (available on LEXIS and copy on file at University
of Illinois Law Review office).
10. Compare L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 131-35, 727-28 (first amendment
intended to erect separation of church and state "absolute as possible within the limitation of human
communal society") with Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)
("this is a Christian nation"). See also R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982);
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV.
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parture from earlier church-state cases, I1 but as the harbinger of a long-
term shift in the Court's approach.12  Later decisions, which the Court
handed down during the 1984 Term, suggest that this conclusion was
wrong, or at least premature. In these later decisions, the Court, by thin
majorities, reverted to a jurisprudence less approving of government "ac-
commodation" to religion than the holding in Lynch. Thus, the Court
invalidated Alabama's one minute period of silence in public schools "for
meditation or involuntary prayer."1 3 The Court also held that a public
school district cannot implement shared time and community education
programs consistently with the establishment clause. 14
These and other 1985 rulings 5 are an insufficient basis on which to
estimate the staying power of Lynch v. Donnelly. Lynch could yet be a
harbinger of things to come or merely a derelict on the waters of the law.
In the authors' judgment, for reasons stated below, the Lynch decision is
wrong in principle and inconsistent with precedent, and it should be
overruled.
Section II describes the facts and history of Lynch. The authors
criticize the Court's opinion in Section III and offer their analysis of the
case in Section IV. Finally, Section V suggests an overall approach to
establishment clause cases that the authors believe is truer to the Court's
precedents, the purposes of the Constitution, and the needs of American
society.
673 (1980); Symposium, The Religion Clauses, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 (1984) (articles by Greena-
wait, Johnson, and Mansfield).
11. Note, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 178-80 (1984).
12. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 771.
13. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
14. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Bail, 105 S. Ct.
3216 (1985). In Grand Rapids School Dist v. Ball, the public school district provided classes to
nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the nonpublic
schools. Of the 41 private schools involved in the two programs, 40 were religious schools. The
"shared time" classes supplemented the state-mandated core curriculum of the nonpublic schools.
The "shared time" teachers were full-time public school employees. The "community education"
program classes were voluntary classes offered at the end of the school day. The "community educa-
tion" teachers were part-time public school employees who usually also were part-time employees of
the same nonpublic schools in which they taught their "community education" classes. 105 S. Ct. at
3218-20.
In Aguilar v. Felton, the City of New York used federal funds to pay the salaries of public
school employees who taught in parochial schools. The federal program authorized federal financial
assistance to local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from
low income families. 105 S. Ct. at 3234-35.
15. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985) (state statute requiring drivers' license photo-
graphs violates first amendment rights of applicant who refuses to be photographed on religious
grounds); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985) (state statute granting employ-
ees right not to work on their chosen sabbath violates the establishment clause because it advances a
particular religious practice); Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 105 S. Ct. 1953
(1985) (application of Fair Labor Standards Act to a nonprofit religious organization does not vio-
late the free exercise and establishment clauses).
No. 4]
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II. LYNCH V. DONNELLY: THE CASE
The relevant facts were few and undisputed. For over forty years,
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, has participated in the celebration
of Christmas by erecting a Christmas display in a park located in the
center of the municipal shopping district, close to city hall. To attract
children and their parents to the downtown district, the display included
a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, plastic reindeers, and similar
Christmas figures and decorations. At the center was a life-sized creche
which was purchased, owned, installed, maintained, and dismantled at
city expense. The figures were arranged to direct attention to the Child.
Two spotlights, lit from sundown to 10:30 p.m., illuminated the Nativity
scene.1 6 The city owned all the lights, figures, and buildings that made
up the display area, and also paid for the electricity. A public lighting
ceremony inaugurated the display each year.1 7
Supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, city taxpayers
brought a lawsuit challenging the city's payment for and display of the
creche as a law "respecting an establishment of religion" forbidden by
the first amendment. 18 Shortly thereafter, Pawtucket's mayor, Dennis
Lynch, held a press conference from a podium adjoining the creche, at
which he vowed to fight what he saw as the ACLU's attempt to take
"Christ out of Christmas." 19 He then walked through a group of chil-
dren, passing his microphone among them as they carolled, and urged
the children to sing "another one that apparently bothers people."20
At trial, the plaintiffs testified to their reaction to the creche.2" The
Mayor and local businessmen tried to place the creche within the larger
holiday commercial setting.22 Experts addressed the nature and effect of
the nativity scene and religious symbols generally, including their effect
on children.23
16. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1154-56 (D.R.I. 1981).
17. Id. at 1156.
18. Id at 1154.
19. Id. at 1158-59.
20. Id. at 1158; Joint Appendix at 94, 168, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
21. Plaintiff Donnelly testified that his reaction was "one of fear." 525 F. Supp. at 1156. He
perceived the creche as "a demonstration of official support for a particular religious viewpoint,
which ran contrary to his strong belief in the separation of church and state." Id. Donnelly re-
garded the city's use of the creche "as exemplifying an increasing tendency of various religious
groups to become more political and thereby to impose their views on the larger society." Id. Other
plaintiffs testified that they viewed "the [C]ity's erection of the creche as demonstrating the City's
support for the Christian religion." Id. at 1157. The creche also "offended their interest in the
separation of church and state." Id.
22. Id. at 1158-59.
23. Id. at 1159-61. The plaintiffs' experts included a clinical psychologist who testified about
"the important role that symbols play in a child's development of a self-image." Id. at 1159. The
creche was "a very powerful symbol of worship... [and] the symbol's impact on a child would be
heightened by the magical quality of the display's bright lights and gifts of candy from Santa." Id.
In the psychologist's opinion, "a child of a non-Christian family, upon seeing the creche as part of a
public display, would wonder whether he and his parents were normal." Id. The creche would also
"reinforce[ ] [in Christian adults] an already prevalent attitude in our country that we are a Chris-
tian country." Id. A religion professor, who was an ordained Methodist minister, also testified for
[V/ol. 1985
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The district court concluded that the city's creche violated each part
of the three part purpose-effects-entanglement test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman 24 for judging establishment clause challenges. The district
court found a religious purpose because the city intended "approval and
endorsement of the religious message that the symbol conveys."25 The
creche also had a religious effect because it conferred "more than a re-
mote and incidental benefit on Christianity"26 by "singl[ing] out" partic-
ular religious beliefs as "worthy of particular attention, thereby implying
that these beliefs are true or especially desirable.""' With respect to en-
tanglement, although the creche had not involved administrative entan-
glement between church and city, the district court held that the creche
had resulted in excessive political strife along religious lines.2"
The court of appeals affirmed,29 but its decision rested principally on
a different theory: because the city had sponsored only the symbols of a
particular religion, Christianity, the court of appeals measured the city's
practice against the compelling interest test of Larson v. Valente,30 which
is applicable to government actions that prefer particular religions. 3
The court of appeals then found that the city's practice failed the strict
scrutiny of the Larson test.32
The Supreme Court reversed 5-4. Rejecting the district court's find-
ings of fact, the Court held that the city's display, notwithstanding its
religious nature, had a secular purpose and effect of "tak[ing] note of a
the plaintiffs. The religion professor conceded that "Christmas is in part a secular celebration be-
longing to the whole American culture." Id at 1160. Nonetheless, he insisted "that parts remained
deeply religious and associated only with Christianity" and expressed "dismay that the City had
demeaned this Christian symbol by setting it in the midst of other, non-religious symbols." Id.
In response, the City called an expert in the fields of religious philosophy and religious symbol-
ism. The defendant's expert testified that, in his view, the creche's purpose was "to help celebrate
Christmas." Id. at 1161. The creche was "essential" to the Christmas display because otherwise "it
would be like having a birthday party without knowing whose birthday it was." Id The professor
attached no religious significance to the creche because "a symbol in a nonreligious context will not
be a religious symbol and will not have a religious. impact." Id
24. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court wrote in Lemon that a statute must pass three
tests to withstand establishment clause challenge. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion...; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
Id (citations omitted).
25. 525 F. Supp. at 1174.
26. Id at 1178.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1178-80.
29. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
30. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
31. 691 F.2d at 1034. The Supreme Court had decided Larson after both the district court's
decision in Lynch and oral argument in the court of appeals. Id at 1034. In Larson, the Supreme
Court made clear that "the Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply to laws affording a
uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions. . . that discriminate among religions." 456
U.S. at 252 (emphasis in original). For statutes effectively granting a denominational preference, the
Court found appropriate a test of "strict scrutiny," which required invalidation unless the provision
in question was "justified by a compelling governmental interest" and was "closely fitted to further
that interest." 456 U.S. at 246-52.
32. 691 F.2d at 1034-35.
No. 4]
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significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western
World.""3 The Court further held that political strife occurring after ini-
tiation of a lawsuit which challenges a practice is irrelevant as proof of
political entanglement.3 4 Finally, the Court summarily rejected the court
of appeals' conclusion that government sponsorship of a creche
amounted to a religious preference meriting application of the Larson
compelling interest test. 5
III. LYNCH v DONNELLY: FAILURES OF PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court's obligation to provide bases solidly grounded
in history or principle for its decisions is vital to its constitutional role as
dispenser of law and not wielder of raw political power. Ad hoc or result-
oriented decisions erode respect for and allegiance to the Court's com-
mands, and diminish the Court's ability to resolve peaceably the funda-
mental issues that the Constitution subjects to judicial and not political
settlement. This approach is hardly novel; it traces at least to Thayer3
6
and is the basic objection that some scholars levelled at decisions of the
Warren Court. 37 Whatever the validity of those criticisms in other con-
texts, they squarely apply to Lynch v. Donnelly.
A. The Unjustified Premise
The principal premise on which the Court based its opinion is evi-
dent at the outset. After a brief bow to the theme of separation,38 the
Court observed that "total separation is not possible. . . . Some rela-
tionship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."139
From that point onward, the Court stressed "accommodation" as the
dominant theme of the establishment clause. Jefferson's famous "wall of
separation"'  was virtually ignored,4 demoted from the central place it
occupied in prior cases42 to merely "a useful figure of speech. . . [which]
33. 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
34. Id at 1364-65.
35. Id. at 1366 n.13. The Court stated: "It is correct that we require strict scrutiny of a statute
or practice patently discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this display, or any part of
it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson." Id.
36. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REv. 129 (1893).
37. See, e.g., Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 99-100, 123 (1959); Kurland, The Supreme Court. 1963 Term-Fore-
word: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government,
78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 170 (1964).
38. 104 S. Ct. at 1358. The entire discussion consisted of one sentence: "This Court has ex-
plained that the purpose of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is
'to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the state) into the precincts of the
other.'" Id. (quoting from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 1358 (quoting from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
40. Letter of Jan. 1, 1802, in 16 WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Bergh ed.
1905).
41. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
42. Eg., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) ("(Tihe First Amendment's
[Vol. 1985
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is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the rela-
tionship that in fact exists between church and state. ' 43 The Court's
presentation of its premise bears examination:
No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can
exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other
parts, much less from government. "It has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separa-
tion. . . ." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist. Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.
See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson; McCollum v. Board of Education. Any-
thing less would require the "callous indifference" we have said was
never intended by the Establishment Clause."
Stripped of adornment, this passage means that because total sepa-
ration is impossible, separation is useless as a working principle; because
some accommodation is practically indispensable, accommodation must
be the working principle behind the religion clauses. This reasoning is
unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, the Court committed an elementary logical error in finding
that because accommodation is inevitable, it is broadly required. To say
that the government cannot prevent death from hunger hardly means
that termination of welfare benefits is either affirmatively mandated or a
commendable goal of the state's police powers.
Second, the Court's premise sweeps far too broadly. The free exer-
cise argument implicit in the Court's accommodation principle-that
Pawtucket's display is affirmatively mandated to vindicate the free exer-
cise of its citizens' religious beliefs-was unnecessary to the decision.
Both the parties and the Solicitor General, who appeared amicus cu-
riae,45 rejected this argument for good reason. The city itself can have no
free exercise claim.46 Furthermore, prior decisions do not support the
notion that the city's residents, who are free to believe whatever doctrines
they choose, worship where and as they please, and place creches on
private property wherever they like, additionally have a free exercise
language, properly interpreted,. . . [has] erected a wall of separation between Church and State.");
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall be-
tween church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach.").
43. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
44. 104 S. Ct. at 1359 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
45. Some amicus briefs filed by conservatives and some Christian groups, however, did address
the free exercise argument. See, e.g., Brief for the Coalition for Religious Liberty and Freedom
Council asAmici Curiae, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984); Brief for the Legal Foundation
of America as Amicus Curiae, id.; Brief for the United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae,
id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishment clause). See also Anderson v. City of Boston, 376
Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (municipalities lack free
speech rights).
No. 4]
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claim to city support for their celebration through a city-sponsored
creche.47
Nor did the cases on which the Court relied support the Court's
heavy stress on mandated accommodation. Committee for Public Educa-
tion v. Nyquist,48  far from finding separation "[im]possible or
[un]desirable," rejected a comprehensive scheme to accommodate the fi-
nancial needs of parents who sought a religious education for their chil-
dren. 9 Similarly, neither of the Court's two released time cases50 held
that "the Constitution . ..affirmatively mandates accommodation."'"
To the contrary, McCollum52 found accommodation prohibited when it
allied the state with sectarian education. Zorach 3 approved a released
time program only because virtually total separation accompanied the
program; the state aided sectarian education only through early release
of children from compulsory public education. Zorach would support
the Lynch Court's premise only if Zorach's "accommodation" were state
sponsorship of religious activity, on school premises, for the majority of
students. This is precisely what McCollum condemned.
The Court's assertion that the religion clauses affirmatively mandate
accommodation when the state itself has not imposed obstacles to free
exercise was novel. To be sure, the Court had referred to free exercise
values in the past in rejecting some establishment clause claims. 4 But no
Justice had ever suggested that Zorach's released time program 5 or
Walz's tax exemption56 were "affirmatively mandate[d]." Those cases
47. Whether the residents could commandeer public land from an unwilling city for a creche
under public forum analysis is, of course, a different question. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1984), affid by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of Trustees of Village of Scarsdale
v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). Petitioners in McCreary dropped all free exercise claims,
which both lower courts had rejected, and raised only free speech claims. In Lynch, although private
citizens themselves could have set up the creche at issue-the park itself was private property-they
could not have invoked the free speech provisions of the federal Constitution to require the city or
the private landowner to do so. Compare Lloyd Corp., Inc. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (first
amendment does not provide right of access for speakers on private property) with PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state law may provide right of access for speakers on
certain private property).
48. 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (relied on in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359).
49. In Nyquist, the Court recognized that:
this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and
State. It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separa-
tion, and as a consequence cases arising under these [first amendment] clauses have presented
some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760. Nonetheless, the Court went on to reject the financial aid program at issue
in Nyquist.
50. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
51. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
52. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
53. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
54. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673, 676-77 (1970); Zorach v. Clausen, 343
U.S. 306, 312-15 (1952).
55. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
56. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for charita-
ble property, including churches).
[Vol. 1985
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held merely that accommodation was permissible. One member of the
Lynch Court's majority, Justice White, is recently on record as strongly
denying a mandatory accommodation57 which could be applied to vitiate
almost every establishment clause claim.5"
Finally, the accommodation principle described by the Lynch Court
is too unfocused to help decide future cases, or even to decide the Lynch
case itself. The Court's text was Justice Douglas's statement in Zorach v.
Clauson that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."'59  This credo could as well be the centerpiece of
church-state sentiment in countries with established religions, such as
England, Italy, Israel, or Iran. The credo is out of place in the United
States, whose dedication to separation of church and state has long been
held one of its creative contributions of statecraft.'
As the Court noted, presidents proclaim national days of
thanksgiving, municipal art galleries house pictures with religious
themes, and the national coins, anthem, and pledge of allegiance rou-
tinely appeal to God.6 1 But because some religious practices, such as
posting of the Ten Commandments,62 teacher-led prayers,63 and school
Bible readings' have been held to violate the first amendment, particular
cases must turn on identification of a principle which distinguishes the
forbidden from the valid. If the instances of accommodation listed by
the Chief Justice are relevant to an emergent principle, the Court. did not
identify it.
The Court's approach is exemplified by its willingness to conclude,
from the fact that public employees are paid for but released from duties
on national holidays, including Christmas, that the government has
"long recognized" religious holidays and "indeed it has subsidized"'6
57. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). For Justice
White's general views on accommodation and the establishment clause, see, e.g., Committee for
Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
58. The state could defend nearly every kind of governmental assistance to religion, from
school aid released time to the erection of symbols or displays or distribution of religious texts, as an
attempt to "accommodate" the preferences of some individuals. Justice O'Connor recently ex-
plained that if this kind of accommodation were mandatory, going well beyond simply lifting state-
imposed barriers as in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents exempted from
sending their children to secondary school), then the provision of such assistance in nearly every case
would be immune from establishment clause attack. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2504
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (quoted in Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360).
60. Justice Douglas explained and qualified his Zorach dictum in his concurring opinion in
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962). Douglas pointed out that "if a religious leaven is to be
worked into the affairs of our people, it is to be done by individuals and groups not by the Govern-
ment." Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
61. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
62. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
63. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
64. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
65. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360.
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them. Cases such as Everson66 and Walz, 67 however, did not treat the
state payments in question as subsidies to religion.68 To so characterize
them would irreconcilably conflict with Everson's unanimous conclusion
that the establishment clause means that no tax can be levied to support
religious activities or institutions.69
B. The Misuses of History
The Court's effort to marshal history to support the judgment in
Lynch was as unsatisfactory as its attempt to base its understanding of
the establishment clause on its values of accommodation. The opinion
betrays a serious confusion as to the uses of history in constitutional
analysis.
A comparison of Lynch with Marsh v. Chambers,7" the previous
Term's opinion upholding Nebraska's employment of a legislative chap-
lain, illustrates this confusion. In Marsh, which the Chief Justice also
wrote, the Court began with a careful historical review of legislative
chaplaincies from colonial times to the present.71 Marsh had relied heav-
ily (although not exclusively) on the fact that "[iln the very week that
Congress approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights
for submission to the states, it enacted legislation providing for paid
chaplains for the House and Senate."72 From this event, the Court con-
cluded that legislative chaplaincies had "become part of the fabric of our
society."73
Because that conclusion was in substantial conflict with long-stand-
ing establishment clause principles previously enunciated by the Supreme
Court, the Marsh Court did not attempt to reconcile the practice of state-
supported chaplains with those principles. Rather, the Court treated the
66. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state reimbursements to parents
for fares paid for the transportation of children attending sectarian schools).
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for charita-
ble property, including churches).
68. The Court viewed the bus transportation in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18, and the property
tax exemption in Walz, 397 U.S. at 675, not as subsidies to religion but as social welfare benefits.
69. 330 U.S. at 15-16. Compare Justice Black's famous distillation of the first amendment for
the majority in Everson (in which, presumably, the even stricter dissent would have joined) ("[Tlhe
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can. . . pass laws which aid one religion, [or] aid all religions. . . . No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach . . . religion," id.) with Chief Justice
Burger's statement in Lynch that "an absolutist approach" to the establishment clause "is simplistic
and has been uniformly rejected by the Court." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361.
70. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
71. Id. at 786-92.
72. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359 (paraphrasing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790). This is the central piece
of historical evidence relied on in R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982), a leading
revisionist history of the establishment clause taking issue with Pfeffer's body of work. See supra
note 10. Cord's book and ideas were cited approvingly, but without critical analysis in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2515 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
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case as an exception based on "this unique history."'74 This treatment is
essentially the approach the Court had used in Walz" to uphold tax
exemptions for religious property, and, somewhat ambiguously, to up-
hold Sunday closing laws in McGowan v. Maryland.76 In essence, the
Court has found that long historical practice may show that "those con-
sequences which the Framers deeply feared""' are unlikely to spring
from a given practice. This finding does not mean that, in the absence of
proven experience, the Court has rejected the bedrock establishment
clause doctrine that has guided the Court since the first case, Everson v.
Board of Education.7"
No relevant, long-established historical practice existed in Lynch.
Indeed, both petitioners and the Solicitor General conceded that Christ-
mas was not recognized as a public holiday before the middle of the last
century.79 Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion reminded the Court of
historical scholarship which showed that Massachusetts, at least, had
"pursued a vigilant policy of opposition to any public celebration of the
holiday.""0 Large Christian sects, including Presbyterians, Congrega-
tionalists, Baptists, and Methodists, opposed the celebration itself, much
less public recognition of the holiday, until well into the nineteenth
century."1
The Lynch Court principally relied on two historical items. The
first item was the fact, already noted as important in the Marsh case,82
that the first Congress legislated paid chaplains for the Senate and House
of Representatives.83 The Court's additional evidence was its reference
to "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches
of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789" 84-largely
proclamations, mottos on coins, and the like. This evidence, however,
was plainly too general to support a result based on the Marsh theory of
historical exception.85
The issue is not whether the Court can validly rely on history, espe-
cially history postdating adoption of the first amendment; the issue is
how the Court should rely on history. If the Court must decide whether
74. Id. at 791.
75. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
76. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
77. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state reimbursements to parents for fares paid to transport
children attending sectarian schools).
79. See 104 S. Ct. at 1383 n.25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1384.
81. Id.
82. 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983). See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
83. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
84. Id. at 1360.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 70-81 (noting that the Court has relied on specific his-
torical evidence to reach results otherwise forbidden by logical extension of settled principles in only
two establishment cases prior to Lynch, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970)).
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creches (or tax exemptions) present the dangers of which the framers
warned, then evidence concerning past experience with creches or tax
exemptions would be useful. If the Court is searching instead for over-
arching principles, then the relevant history would be the events and pur-
poses which led every state to prohibit establishment in their
constitutions and, subsequently, in the federal constitution as well. 6
The Court in Lynch wholly ignored these events and purposes. By
contrast, the bill establishing a legislative chaplaincy is only of limited,
subsidiary importance for interpreting the first amendment. Chaplaincy
legislation had nothing to do with Christmas, creches, or the governmen-
tal display of religious symbols to the general public. Further, the
Court's use of history is questionable insofar as it relies on the activities
of the first Congress to define the establishment clause, since the first
amendment was "forced upon Congress by a number of the States as a
condition for their ratification of the original Constitution." 7 Insofar as
Lynch ignored Madison and Jefferson and eschewed any attempt to de-
rive principles from the history which is central to understanding reli-
gious clauses, the case is fatally flawed.
Apart from selecting dubious historical materials, the Court at-
tempted to do too much, too mechanically, with the evidence. The Chief
Justice used the first Congress's approval of legislative chaplaincies as a
yardstick against which all religious practices should be measured. He
said that because "it would be difficult to identify a more striking exam-
ple of the accommodation of religious beliefs intended by the Framers,""8
the creche, a lesser accommodation, must be constitutional as well.
The conclusion is questionable even on its own terms. The proposi-
tion is doubtful that formal, brief invocations at the opening of legislative
bodies are a "more striking," or greater, accommodation than compel-
ling non-Christian (and indeed many separationist Christian) taxpayers
to devote tax dollars to the purchase, maintenance, and display of a reli-
gious symbol. Even if judges could easily discern "greater" from "lesser"
infringements, constitutional law does not always extend its protection in
such linear fashion.8 9 Therefore, the Court's "yardstick approach" pro-
86. See supra text accompanying notes 177-185.
87. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 816. Moreover, as Justice Brennan also remarked, reliance on the
contemporaneous acts of Congress to elucidate the broad and majestic purposes of the Constitution
"should be advanced with some hesitation in light of certain other skeletons in the congressional
closet" such as an act of Congress requiring racial segregation of the public schools in the District of
Columbia, enacted a week after Congress proposed the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 814 n.30.
The Court's unwillingness fairly to confront historical evidence also is demonstrated by its as-
sertion that it can find in the American experience only "evidence of accommodation of all faiths
and all forms of religious expression, and hostility toward none," Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361, notwith-
standing repeated desecration of Indian holy places, discrimination against Mormons and Roman
Catholics, anti-semitism openly practiced by prestigious universities for decades, anti-polygamy
laws, and laws requiring religious test oaths for public office.
88. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359-60.
89. The eighth amendment sanctions the death penalty, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), but prohibits denationalization, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967) and torture,
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duces a false sense that the result in any particular case is the objectively
derived view of the framers, when in fact the approach masks and invites
unbridled judicial subjectivity.9"
More fundamentally, the Court's use of history conflicts with prior
cases. Confronted with the broad generalities of the Constitution, the
Court in the past has used history most profitably not to seek specific
answers to modem questions, but rather to evoke underlying themes,
purposes, and principles.9" The Lynch Court's reliance on the first Con-
gress's chaplaincy is in striking contrast to the Court's celebrated refusal
in Brown v. Board of Education 92 to be bound by the 65th Congress's
attitude to segregated schools, or, in New York Times v. Sullivan,9 3 to the
first Congress's attitude to the alien and sedition acts. The methodology
of Lynch v. Donnelly left the Court "at sea, free to select random ele-
ments of America's varied history solely to suit the views of five Mem-
bers of this Court."94
C. The Half-Hearted Selection of the Lemon Test and the Limitation
of Larson v. Valente
Having set out principles and historical analysis that would make
determining the height, or even the location, of Thomas Jefferson's old
wall quite impossible, the Court announced that to survey the "blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier" 95 depended on "all the circumstances of
a particular relationship" 96 and could be accomplished only case-by-
case.97 The Court did not explain why this uncertainty, so worrisome in
other areas of constitutional law, was not cause for alarm here. To the
contrary, the Court enhanced the fluidity of its approach by casting
doubt on what test it would use to decide particular cases.98
The Court left the meaning of past precedent confused in two princi-
pal respects. The first problem is how the Court treated the test on
which it did rely, the familiar three-part analysis first enunciated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman: whether the challenged law or conduct has a secu-
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). The first amendment may permit prior restraints on the
press in certain extraordinary circumstances, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569-
70 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), but appropriately bars a right of reply in all,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
90. For a recent (but unsuccessful) attempt to rely on Lynch's yardstick approach, see Aguilar
v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3242 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. Id
93. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(construing jury guarantee in accordance with principles derived from history, not with historical
practice per se); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
94. 104 S. Ct. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614).
96. Id.
97. Id at 1361-62.
98. The Court emphasized its "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area." I/, at 1362.
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lar or religious purpose, whether its primary effect is to advance or in-
hibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of
government with religion.9 9 The Court said that "[i]n the line-drawing
process we have often found it useful"' loo to use the Lemon test, but "we
have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any sin-
gle test or criterion in this sensitive area." 101 Such a cryptic and ambiva-
lent introduction invites questions as to why the Court deemed the
Lemon test controlling here, why the Court depreciated the test it was
about to employ, and what the status of the test was for future
controversies. 
10 2
The second problem was the Court's delphic rejection of the com-
pelling interest test. Less than two years previously, in Larson v. Va-
lente,"°3 the Court had held that state action distinguishing between, or
preferring, certain demoninational groups was "suspect [and subject to]
strict scrutiny.""' The court of appeals in Lynch had relied principally
on Larson because the district court had found that the creche, unlike a
star, a bell, or a tree, had religious significance as "a direct representation
of the full Biblical account of the birth of Christ.' °5 Because "the city's
ownership and use of the nativity scene is an act which discriminates
between Christian and non-Christian religions,"' 0 6 the court of appeals'
reliance on the Larson test was, at a minimum, reasonable; indeed, re-
spondents and numerous amici had invoked the test.
The Supreme Court addressed its failure to use the Larson test only
in a conclusory footnote, stating "[ilt is correct that we require strict
scrutiny of a statute or practice patently discriminatory on its face. But
we are unable to see this display, or any part of it, as explicitly discrimi-
natory in the sense contemplated in Larson." '17
D. The Misuse of Lemon
The Court's application of the three-part Lemon test was no more
satisfactory than its manner of selection.
99. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
100. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
101. Id
102. Subsequent decisions confirmed that the status of the Lemon test was dividing the Court, a
division resolved for the time being in the 1984 Term. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232
(1985) (invalidating federal funds used to pay salaries of public school employers who taught educa-
tionally deprived children in nonpublic schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (invali-
dating moment of silence in public schools).
103. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
104. Id at 246.
105. 691 F.2d at 1032, relying on 525 F. Supp. at 1167. At the time of its decision in 1981, the
district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Larson v. Valente.
106. 691 F.2d at 1034.
107. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13.
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1. Purpose
The purpose inquiry was severely weakened, if not rendered useless,
by the Court's unexplained reformulation of the purpose test. The Lynch
case came to the Supreme Court on the district court's finding of fact,
undisturbed by the court of appeals, that Pawtucket's purpose in spon-
soring the creche was religious. 108 The Supreme Court rejected the find-
ing as clearly erroneous by holding that, in assessing purpose (and, it
turned out, effect as well), the district court erred in focusing so closely
on the creche. In a leap of reasoning, the Court announced that "in this
case, the focus of our inquiry must be [not on the creche per se but
rather] on the creche in the context of the Christmas season.""
It is not apparent, and the Court certainly did not explain, why the
district court erred by concentrating on the creche itself, the only item to
which the plaintiffs objected. Asserted constitutional violations generally
are examined independently, not joined for purposes of analysis to unob-
jectionable governmental conduct. Thus, establishment clause cases,
such as Meek v. Pittenger'10 and Wolman v. Walter,' 11 separately ex-
amined maps, field trips, textbooks, and remedial and diagnostic services
which the state provided to nonpublic schools; the cases did not review
the items together in a larger "context." Had the Court's contextual ap-
proach been applied to Stone v. Graham 112 and the school prayer deci-
sions on which the Court relied to support it, the cases would have been
problematic: in the "context" of a full day of secular education, neither a
brief Bible reading 1 3 nor the posting of the Ten Commandments 1 4 ap-
pears nearly so inimical to the establishment clause. Any alleged viola-
tion can be justified more easily in the context of a range of valid
governmental activities.
Nor is it true, as the Court warned, that to "focus exclusively on the
religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalida-
tion."'1 5 Zorach 116 and McGowan," 17 for example, upheld released time
108. 525 F. Supp. at 1168-74.
109. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
110. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
111. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
112. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (state statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in each public
classroom violated establishment clause).
113. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state statute or school board rule
requiring that schools begin each day with Bible reading violated establishment clause).
114. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The same holds true in other areas of constitutional
law. The Court did not examine Minnesota's print and ink tax on newspapers in the larger context
of the tax incidence on business generally. Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983). Neither did the Court examine the application to state and local governments of
the wage and hour requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act in the context of the generous
revenue sharing funds with which the federal government was then supporting the states. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1978), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). See Schwartz, National League of Cities Again-R.I.P. or a
Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 141 (1985).
115. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
116. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
No. 4]
HeinOnline  -- 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 851 1985
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
programs and Sunday closing laws after examining them independently.
Moreover, Everson "8 and the other school aid cases show that an exclu-
sive focus on the religious component of an activity is often nonsensical
(what is the religious component of a bus ride?). To be sure, to the extent
that challenged government activity is itself religious rather than an aid
to religion, a narrow focus on the religious component may well suggest
invalidation in most cases. But neither the purposes of the establishment
clause nor Supreme Court precedent is inconsistent with a presumption
against religious activity undertaken by government.
The converse proposition, however, must give pause. Were a court
to adopt the Lynch majority's wide-angle inquiry and include the secular
context of the government religious activity, the court would validate
nearly every governmental religious practice. Imagine, for example,
Congressional findings that church attendance is associated with low
drug usage leading to a law rewarding former drug addicts who attend
church. Such a statute does what the first amendment forbids, context
notwithstanding. 119 In applying the Lemon purpose inquiry to such gov-
ernmental activity, the activity's religious nature and not its context
should be decisive.12
0
The Court not only redefined the purpose inquiry, it also weakened
it. No matter how pressing or central the religious purpose, the estab-
lishment clause is now satisfied if the government has "a" secular pur-
pose as well.' 2' This approach enabled the Court to dispense with-
indeed, to ignore-the uncomfortable lower court finding that Mayor
Lynch had expressly used the creche to "put Christ back into Christ-
mas."' 22 As long as Pawtucket had as one of its purposes "depict[ing]
the historical origins of [a] traditional event long recognized as a Na-
tional Holiday"123 and "long celebrated in the Western World,"1 24 a con-
comitant religious purpose, no matter how central to the activity, is
deemed irrelevant. 1
2 5
117. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
118. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
119. The example is not far-fetched. In 1984, officials of the Department of Health and Human
Services had composed and distributed to churches throughout the nation sermons invoking Jesus
Christ to urge churchgoers to adopt young children. See Sawyer, Sermons Sent to Welfare Officials,
Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1985, at A5, col. 1. But as the Chief Justice has recognized, "a state could not
enact a statute providing for a $10 gratuity to everyone who attended religious services weekly. Such
a law would plainly be governmental sponsorship of religious activities; no statutory preamble ex-
pressing purely secular legislative motives would be persuasive." Committee for Public Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 801-02 (1973).
120. As Justice Brennan has long urged, government has no business, except in extraordinary
circumstances, in intentionally using religious ends to serve secular means. An intention to use
religious means is per se purposefully religious. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1375 n.11 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
121. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
122. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1158-59.
123. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
124. Id.
125. Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's opinion, her view that the purpose
requirement "is not satisfied ... by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated
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Although the Court asserted that its formulation of the purpose test
was already the law, previous cases belie that suggestion. When the pur-
pose test has been fatal, the states had indeed put forth secular purposes
that were insufficient to save practices religiously motivated as well.
Thus a quiet and contemplative mood was the justification for Bible read-
ing,' 26 civic virtue was the basis for posting the Ten Commandments,
27
and local control of education was a reason for barring the teaching of
evolution.1 28 Yet the court invalidated all three practices on purpose
grounds. Moreover, the Lynch Court leaped to its new formulation of
the purpose prong without requiring the city to prove that the creche was
not infected with an improper purpose. In other cases, when the Court
has ascertained a mixed purpose, it has repeatedly held that an activity in
which improper purpose plays a role is presumptively illegal. '29 The fail-
ure to square Lynch with those cases was striking.
2. Effect
Lynch v. Donnelly also was unfaithful to the jurisprudence of the
effect prong of the Lemon test. The majority quickly discounted the dis-
trict court's finding that the effect of Pawtucket's display of the creche
was "to confer a substantial benefit on religion in general and on the
Christian religion in particular."' 3 ° The lower court made its findings on
the basis of record evidence concerning "the effect of the nativity
scene."' 31 Such evidence included testimony of the plaintiffs, of experts
on religious symbols, and of psychologists. The court's findings, pro-
tected from reversal unless clearly erroneous, were that symbols play an
important role in children's self-image;' 32 that the nativity scene was a
"powerful symbol of worship, different from such secularized elements"
as Santa Claus and the tree, 133 and in fact "heightened by the lights and
magical quality of the display as a whole"; 3 that a non-Christian child
seeing the display "would wonder whether he and his parents were nor-
mal"; 135 that the official creche "reinforces [in Christian adults] an al-
ready prevalent attitude in our country that we are a Christian
by religious purposes," id. at 1368, leaves Lynch's relaxation of the purpose text in some doubt. The
Court's studied ambiguity on the point in the proceeding term reinforces this doubt. See Wallace v.
Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 ("[A] statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may
satisfy [the purpose test].") (emphasis added).
126. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
127. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
128. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 101 n.7 (1968).
129. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Mt. Healthy
School Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
130. Compare 104 S. Ct. at 1363-64; id. at 1369 (O'Connor, J., concurring) with 525 F. Supp. at
1196-98.
131. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1156-62. See also supra notes 21-28 and accompa-
nying text.
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country"; 136 and that the creche "breeds religious chauvinism and...
the view that non-Christians are 'somewhat unimportant and have less
merit.' ,137
The Supreme Court neither mentioned these findings nor explained
why it treated the "effect" question as purely one of law. It simply held,
"We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances religion in a
sense"; but this advancement is only "'indirect, remote and inciden-
tal.' "138 In other words, the effect of advancing religion which the lower
court found to exist was, as a matter of law, not enough of an effect to
require the Court to validate the lower court's findings.
Whether the creche had the unconstitutional effect of aiding religion
may be a question of law for an appellate court, just as the question
whether a defendant has had a fair trial,139 or whether the first amend-
ment has been violated,1" is in the end a question of law fully open to
Supreme Court review. In deciding whether the effect found by the dis-
trict court was sufficient to establish a violation of the establishment
clause, however, the Court owed its readers something more than the
reasoning it provided:
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would re-
quire that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement
of religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of public
money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students
attending church-sponsored schools, Board of Education v. Allen;
expenditure of public funds for transportation of students to church-
sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of Education; federal grants for
college buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher educa-
tion combining secular and religious education, Tilton; noncategori-
cal grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities, Roemer v.
Board of Public Works; and the tax exemptions for church proper-
ties sanctioned in Walz. It would also require that we view it as
more of an endorsement of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws
upheld in McGowan v. Maryland; the release time program for reli-




138. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364 (quoting from Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 771).
139. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Supreme Court inquiry into whether defendant
was denied sixth amendment right to counsel); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (Supreme
Court inquiry into whether petitioner's allegations were sufficient to show that petitioner was denied
due process).
140. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1958-60 (1984) (appellate court must
independently review whether there is clear and convincing evidence of "actual malice" in cases
governed by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
141. 104 S. Ct. at 1363 (citations omitted).
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Let us examine the cited cases. Walz 142 and Marsh,'43 initially
passed off by the Chief Justice as historical exceptions to assertedly un-
touched principles, 144 are transmuted without explanation to the main-
stream yardstick of the establishment clause. Pawtucket's creche also
was measured against an additional five cases--Allen,145 Everson,146 Roe-
mer, 147  Tilton,14 8 and McGowan 149-which had upheld government
practices against establishment clause challenges. The Court, however,
listed these cases without discussion of an operative principle. Nor were
these cases closer to Lynch on their facts than many other cases-for
example, Lemon, 150 Epperson,151 Stone, 152 Meek 153 -in which the Court
upheld establishment clause challenges.
The Court did address two such cases, 154 finding that the creche was
not an act forbidden by either Larkin v. Grendel's Den 55 (delegating
governmental authority to churches) or McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion 156 (using the state's compulsory education machinery to funnel stu-
dents to religious classes). But Larkin and McCollum are relevant only if
they exhausted the mischiefs against which the first amendment was di-
rected. Far from doing so, these cases plainly did not involve the partic-
ular mischief-favoritism to aparticular religion, Christianity-of which
plaintiffs were complaining. The Lynch Court effectively ignored the ap-
plicable cases in which it had previously addressed the issue of favoritism
to a particular religion, Epperson v. Arkansas '57 and Larson v. Valente;
they were the dogs that didn't bark in the Lynch opinion.
142. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for church properties).
143. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (state legislative chaplaincies).
144. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (upholding legislative chaplaincy based on "this unique his-
tory"); Walz, 397 U.S. at 677-80.
145. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding textbook distribution to church-
sponsored schools).
146. Everson v. Board of Educ. Inc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state reimbursements for bus transpor-
tation to private schools).
147. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants to church-
sponsored colleges and universities).
148. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal grants for building construction on
church-sponsored college campuses).
149. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws).
150. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state-paid salary supplements to teachers of
secular subjects in nonpublic schools).
151. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Arkansas's "anti-evolution" statute violated
establishment clause).
152. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting Ten Commandments in public classrooms).
153. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (auxiliary services provided to nonpublic schools).
154. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
155. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
156. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
157. 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (the sole reason for Arkansas's "anti-evolution" statute was that a
particular religious group considered theory of evolution to conflict with biblical creation account).
158. 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (state statute's "fifty percent" rule imposed registration and reporting
requirements on some religious organizations but not others).
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3. Entanglement
Because the Justices agreed that the nativity display engendered no
administrative entanglement, 59 only "political entanglement" was at is-
sue in Lynch. The Court had earlier suggested, in a notably delphic foot-
note, that the political divisiveness aspect of the entanglement inquiry
was applicable only to programs involving direct grants or reimburse-
ment to religious schools."6° Moreover, because the district court had
not rested its holding independently on the political divisiveness it dis-
cerned, the Court's rejection of the district court's purpose and effect
holdings rendered extended discussion of political entanglement
unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the Court ventured to address the issue, and in so do-
ing betrayed insensitivity to the problem of political division on religious
lines, and especially to the position of religious minorities. Both con-
cerns are among the "principal evils" that the establishment clause
sought to forestall."' The district court had noted no strife before the
lawsuit. In detailed findings, however, the Court portrayed a "horrify-
ing" atmosphere of "anger, hostility, name calling, and political maneu-
vering '  after the lawsuit commenced, "all prompted by the fact that
someone had questioned the city's ownership and display of a religious
symbol."' 63 Having the benefit of close acquaintance with local condi-
tions, the district court opined that the earlier quiet indicated not genu-
ine religious harmony, but rather the minority's fear of speaking out. 6
Chief Justice Burger's opinion rejected the district court's factual conclu-
sions, stressed the earlier calm, and warned that a litigant cannot, by
commencing a lawsuit, "create the appearance of divisiveness and then
exploit it as evidence of entanglement."' 65 On the record before it, in
which the "anger, hostility, name calling, and political maneuvering" '66
were all undertaken by the defendants, the Court's dismissal of the plain-
tiffs' concerns was akin to calling the plaintiffs and their supporters
"uppity." 167
Justice O'Connor stated that the potential of a particular religious
practice for political divisiveness in a given community, much less the
159. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
160. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.ll (1983).
161. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)
(quoted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)).
162. 525 F. Supp. at 1180.
163. Id at 1180.
164. Id. at 1179-80.
165. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
166. 525 F. Supp. at 1180.
167. Compare Professor Tribe's comments on Lynch v. Donnelly: "What does it say about the
nation that it feels comfortable making people feel like outsiders .. " Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of
Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 165 (1984). But
see Johnson, Concepts and Compromise, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 831 (1984) ("[By encouraging
persons who are easily offended by religious symbolism to believe that the courts stand open to
remedy their complaints, the courts foster divisive conflicts over religion.").
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divisiveness actually spawned, is too uncertain a ground on which to rest
judgment, and that the focus should ordinarily be "on the character of
the government activity that might cause such divisiveness." 168 Her po-
sition may have merit, but it leaves unresolved how courts are to deter-
mine what activities have the requisite impermissible character except by
judgments informed by past experience. Put another way, the strife that
erupted in Pawtucket on the part of Christian citizens angry about the
efforts of Christians and non-Christians to terminate the city's sponsor-
ship of a creche indicates something important about the character of
that activity. The Court's failure to find that strife meaningful was
hardly consistent with its previous recognition that political division
along religious lines was a principal evil addressed by the establishment
clause. 6 9
IV. LYNCH REDONE
A. Correcting the Focus
The central theme of Chief Justice Burger's opinion was its concern
with the majority group's interest in publicly celebrating Christmas, even
to the extent of an official public celebration. The majority group be-
lieved that evoking such spirit was a worthy object of municipal atten-
tion: "The display engenders a friendly community spirit of good will in
keeping with the season." 7 ° Indeed, when the Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' attack on the creche it did so in part because judgment for the plain-
tiffs would render unconstitutional "a host of other forms of taking
official note of Christmas, and of our religious heritage." '' The Lynch
Court found the" 'fears and political problems' that gave rise to the Reli-
gion Clauses in the eighteenth century are of far less concern today"; 72
state support of the religious spirit of a broad majority of its citizens was
not dangerous unless "these symbols pose a real danger of establishment
of a state church," which on these facts was "far-fetched indeed."' 173
The Court thus assumed the stance of the majority group whose
symbols were on display. Based on that point of view, the opinions of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor rest on the characterization
of Pawtucket's creche--despite its religious significance-as "secular,"
and therefore well within the government's general powers and insulated
from establishment clause challenge. Instead, the Court's inquiry should
have been whether municipally sponsored creches advance or damage
168. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Freund, supra note 160.
170. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
171. Iat
172. Id
173. Id. at 1366. The Chief Justice repeated this theme in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105
S. Ct. 2479, 2507 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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the underlying values served by the establishment clause. The Court
should have inquired whether those who oppose the creche suffered the
kind of harm that the framers believed the establishment clause would
prevent. Did the plaintiffs here suffer the sort of injury that the Barnettes
did from West Virginia's flag salute practice?'74 As the Engels and
Schempps felt from public school prayer?'75 If so, what establishment
clause values might justify a different result here from that reached in
those cases? If, as Justice O'Connor argued, 76 the core case for judicial
enforcement of the establishment clause is one in which religious minori-
ties suffer the psychic injury, and often accompanying political disability,
resulting from government preference for the religious majority, why is
Lynch not a core case?
Had the Court focused on the relevant constitutional values from
the standpoint of dissenting viewers of the creche, as it should have, it
would have reached a different result. As the Court often has stressed,
these constitutional values guarantee religious liberty and preserve indi-
vidual spheres of influence immune from state control: the right to be let
alone in matters of conscience and a concomitant right to practice reli-
gion free from government influence or coercion;.77 the avoidance of per-
secution; 8 the fostering of social unity and consequent avoidance of
religiously-based social discord; t'" and the protection of a pluralistic so-
ciety from religious dogmatism. 180
Some scholars reject one or all of these purposes. They accept a far
174. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
175. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
176. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Braunfeld v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Pennsylvania has
passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic
survival. . . . [T]he impact of this law . . . grossly violates their constitutional right to the free
exercise of their religion."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official. . . can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
178. E.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1946) (The framers' abhorrence of reli-
gious persecution "found expression in the First Amendment."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 175 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (The Court should "hesitate before approving the applica-
tion of a statute that might be used as another instrument of oppression.").
179. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (The first amend-
ment was written to prohibit laws which link "state and churches together in controlling the lives
and destinies of. . . a citizenship composed of myriad religious faiths, some of them hostile to and
completely intolerant of the others."). See also Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("(E]xcessive entanglement with religious institutions ... may interfere with the independence of
the institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully shared
by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined along
religious lines.").
180. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (The effect, if any, of posting the Ten Com-
mandments in public classrooms would be "to induce the school children to read, meditate upon,
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. . . . (This] is not a permissible state objective
under the Establishment Clause."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968) (Arkansas's
"anti-evolution" statute violated the establishment clause because "fundamentalist sectarian convic-
tion was. . . the law's reason for existence.").
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narrower view of the establishment clause, discerning neither a guarantee
of equality as between religion and nonreligion, nor a ban on aid to all
religion.' But even these observers agree that the clause was intended
"to prohibit. . . those official activities that tended to promote the inter-
ests of one [religion] or another."' 82 In other words, whatever else it was
intended to do, the establishment clause was designed at least to avoid
having the government prefer one religion over another, not only finan-
cially, but through intangible benefits or burdens. The municipal display
of a Christian creche as a religious symbol surely involves such a prefer-
ence."8 3 As Justice Brennan stated in dissent, "for those who do not
share [Christian] beliefs, the symbolic re-enactment of the birth of a di-
vine being who has been miraculously incarnated as a man stands as a
dramatic reminder of their differences."' 84 The effect on minority reli-
gious groups, as well as on those who reject all religion, is "to convey the
message that their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition
nor entitled to public support." '185
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion obfuscated this central
point, observing that "whatever benefit to one faith or religion, or to all
religions, is indirect, remote and incidental."18 6 The Court could hardly
be unaware that a creche cannot possibly be a benefit to any religion
other than Christianity.
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, recognized the central issue of
official preference. She wrote that the establishment clause prohibits
"government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community,"' 87 either through exces-
sive entanglement, or through governmental endorsement or disapproval
of religion. She said that the principal harm from government endorse-
ment is that it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community."' 88 But Justice O'Connor
failed to accept the full implications of that insight. She stressed public
181. See M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS, THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (AEI 1978); R. CORD, supra note 72; SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SCHOOL
PRAYER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, S. REP. No. 347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-75 (1984). This
view has been accepted on the Court only by Justice Rehnquist, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at
2520, although Justice White has indicated his willingness to consider it as well, id. at 2508.
182. M. MALBIN, supra note 181, at 14-15.
183. In a passage that merits repetition, James Madison explained the fears that such preference
stimulated in the framers of the Constitution: "Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease, any
particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?" Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, I WRmNGS OF JAMES MADISON 163-64 (Lippincott ed. 1865).
184. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1373.
186. Id at 1364. The Court wrote that it would be a "stilted over-reaction" to forbid the city's
use of the creche "at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and
carols in public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and legislatures open ses-
sions with prayers by paid chaplains." Id. at 1365.
187. Id at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. Id
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perception, but, like the Chief Justice, she ultimately looked only to the
perception of the public at large. One might, without disrespect, describe
this as the view of the "reasonable Christian man." For the mainstream
majority, which undertakes the greater part of its Christmas celebration
not in church but on Fifth Avenue or in Pawtucket's shopping mall, Jus-
tice O'Connor may well be right that the city's display of a creche "can-
not fairly be understood to convey a message of government endorsement
of religion."' 8 9 For certain devout Christians, Jews, other believers in
non-Christian faiths, and nonbelievers, the creche does precisely that and
therefore offends and stigmatizes. 90
The way in which the Court's reverse focus skewed its analysis can
be seen by considering the municipal display of religious art to which the
Chief Justice's opinion repeatedly referred. Unlike a municipal mu-
seum's purchase and display of religious art works, which will commonly
encompass art from different faiths-Caravaggio's Deposition from the
Cross, Rembrandt's painting of Queen Esther's Feast, an Indian Buddha,
tribal masks from Oceanic cults-Pawtucket's decision to display a
creche provided symbols of only one religion-the dominant faith. Paw-
tucket's criteria, unlike a museum's, were based on religion: the city
sought to display a religious symbol qua religious symbol (to "put Christ
back into Christmas"), not an object whose religious content was the
vehicle for art. Because the religious impact of the symbol was critical to
the decision to display it, and because the symbol was so narrowly sectar-
ian, the impact on non-Christians was likely to be altogether different
than, for example, the impact of a Giotto crucifixion on Jewish or Mos-
lem visitors to a municipal museum.
This difference in perspective was crucial. The Lynch majority ap-
proached the case as if the government had the power, if not the obliga-
tion, to foster what was repeatedly called in several briefs supporting
Pawtucket the "American civil religion"-as much cultural as religious,
interdenominational, theistic, and expressly (but not loudly) Christian.'91
A view of municipal religious displays and nativity scenes in partic-
ular which stresses the majority group's social coalescence around shared
nonpolitical symbols is unfaithful to the origins and continuing role of
the establishment clause. Such a view exaggerates the need for the state
to further the majority group's interests; the opportunities for private dis-
plays are so numerous that state creches are unnecessary to advance
either the religious goals of the Christian majority or the larger interest
189. Id. at 1369.
190. See, e.g., Brief for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the American Jewish
Congress as Amici Curiae, Lynch, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984); Brief for the American Jewish Committee
and the National Council of Churches as Amici Curiae, id. A petition for rehearing jointly filed by
respondents and a number of Jewish social and religious organizations made the same point. The
Court denied the petition for rehearing. 104 S. Ct. 2376 (1984).
191. Cf Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1369 (O'Connor, J., concurring); M. SMITH, THE
SPECIAL PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 83, 100-04.
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in interdenominational social unity. More importantly, as previously
noted, the Court's approach turns the establishment clause on its head by
emphasizing the majority group's interest in state display of religious
symbols rather than the minority's interest in avoiding such state
support.
The establishment clause is hardly unique in providing protection
principally against the majority, and consequently in requiring courts to
assume the perspective of a minority when enforcing the clause's guaran-
tees. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights entrenched certain rights
precisely to secure the unpopular or disadvantaged from incursion by
legislative majorities. 192 The modern theory of judicial review, whether
espoused by liberals or conservatives, activists or passivists, recognizes
that the central and distinctive role of the federal courts in our system of
government lies principally in interpreting and implementing those
counter majoritarian guarantees.' 93
To be sure, the entire society is thought to benefit in the end from
the active enforcement of constitutional rights. But the countervailing
force of the Constitution and judicial review exists principally for the
benefit of minorities-in Edmond Cahn's phrase, the consumers of the
Bill of Rights.' 94 The Lynch majority was untrue to this constitutional
function in general and to the establishment clause in particular. The
Court took a shield designed to guard those oppressed by a political ma-
jority's decision to involve the state in matters properly left to the
Church and transformed it into a sword for that very purpose.
In determining whether litigants who seek establishment clause pro-
tection have been harmed by government's display of religious symbols,
the Court must decide whether there has been a religious endorsement
not from the viewpoint of the majority, or of a hypothetical reasonable
man, but rather from the viewpoint of those who reasonably claim to
have been harmed.
B. Accommodation: How Much Is Too Much?
A minority-based approach to the establishment clause invites chal-
lenge on two grounds. The first is that it insufficiently respects the value
of accommodation, thereby unduly abridging the coordinate values em-
192. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1021 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (stressing importance of judicial review to preserve constitutional boundaries on legisla-
tive power). See generally Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 911, 912-29 (1979).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Moreover, the theory of article III standing reflects this perspec-
tive: individuals specifically harmed by the majority's abridgment of their particular rights, and not
citizens generally, can seek judicial enforcement of constitutional guarantees. One of the principal
cases in which the Court so held involved the establishment clause, Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
194. Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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bodied in the free exercise clause.'" 5 Such an objection would not be
relevant, however, even if the Court did assume a dissenter's perspective
in this case. Judgment against Pawtucket would not have abridged any
valid free exercise interest. The majority would remain free, as before, to
exercise its religious beliefs by displaying creches publicly on private
property-front lawns, church grounds, commercial premises-and by
participating in other family, group, and church activities that make up
the Christmas season. Pawtucket had not erected governmental obsta-
cles to private religious observances as the states had done in other clas-
sic accommodation cases.' 96 To the contrary, far from impeding private
celebration of Christmas, the government aids Christmas celebrations
through tax code provisions.19 7 By any fair measure, the claim that the
city must display its own creche to provide a reasonable opportunity for
its citizens to exercise their religious beliefs (or to remove state obstacles
to free exercise) is untenable.1 98
Nor are municipal creches defensible as a permissible accommoda-
tion, whose invalidation would infringe free exercise interests the major-
ity group had chosen to protect. The first amendment permits
accommodation in some circumstances even if accommodation is not re-
quired.' 99 But accommodation is not a universal defense to establish-
ment claims; otherwise such claims would swallow the establishment
clause in every case.2"
Two factors ordinarily determine whether government involvement
with religion is a permissible accommodation of free exercise. The first is
whether the state is genuinely removing obstacles to free exercise (for
example, by providing military chaplains to servicemen stationed far
195. The Lynch Court itself underlined its reliance on an accommodation rationale by warning
at the outset of its opinion that unless the government did more than "merely tolera[te]" religion,
unless it "affirmatively... accommodate[d]" religion, it would be at "war with our national tradi-
tion as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion." Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1359. For representative cases where practices struck down under the establishment clause
were unsuccessfully defended as necessary to implement the free exercise rights of affected parties, or
at least as a permissible means of doing so, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state-paid
salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (official school prayer); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark.
1982) (rejecting argument that free exercise justified law requiring teaching of "creation science").
196. See, eg., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to
person whose religious beliefs forbade employment in armaments factory violated free exercise
right); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish exempted from sending children to secon-
dary school); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to claimant
whose religious beliefs forbade Saturday work violated free exercise rights).
197. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (exemption for contributions to religious organizations for reli-
gious purposes).
198. Thus, when private parties have sought to compel the display of creches on public land,
they have relied on the public forum rationale of the free speech clause, not on free exercise. See
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), affid by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of
Trustees of Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
199. Eg., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (employer required to
make "reasonable accommodations" to employee's religious beliefs); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws).
200. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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from places of worship)2 °1 or whether the state is merely supplementing
opportunities which already exist (school prayer).20 2 The second factor
is whether the state facilitates free exercise merely by providing services
secular and neutral in themselves (school bus transportation or making a
mall available for a religious service by the Pope),20 3 or whether the state
becomes directly involved in religious activity (printing prayer books or
erecting crosses for the Pope).2 °4
Municipal creches do not score well by either measure. Numerous
opportunities exist virtually in every American community to participate
freely in Christmas celebrations, ranging from purely secular to devout.
In addition, unlike merely making the day a holiday available for wor-
ship by those so inclined, official display of a creche provides a religious,
not a secular service.
The second and more general objection to a minority-centered ap-
proach to the establishment clause is its alleged hypersensitivity and lack
of realism.205 In this view the majority's imposition on the minority is
virtually inevitable. Whatever the status of municipal creches, many
non-Christians will feel a sense of alienation during the Christmas sea-
son, but their perception of themselves as outsiders is a function of a
reality for which government is not responsible.
This argument falls short. The very purpose of the first amendment
was to limit the occasions in which untrammelled majorities could im-
pose on minorities. For example, the majority cannot require Jehovah's
Witnesses to salute the flag; 20 6 or require the Amish to send their chil-
dren to secondary school; 20 7 or force political nonconformists to display
uncongenial political slogans;208 or require religious tests for public of-
fice. 209 Although the establishment clause cannot erase the experience
that Jews or atheists face in a sometimes hostile Christian community, or
persuade them that they are not outsiders, this fact does not prevent the
201. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1962); id. at 296 (Brennan,
J., concurring); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). Those obstacles are usually state-
created, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 405 U.S. 205 (1972) (state statute requiring parents, including
Amish parents, to send children to secondary school); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (de-
nial of unemployment benefits to person whose religious beliefs precluded Saturday work), but they
may be imposed by private actors as well, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977) (employer requiring employee to work on employee's sabbath); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985) (employer requiring management employee to work on Sunday, transfer
to another location, or accept non-management position).
202. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
203. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
204. Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981). See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785 n.3 (1983) (noting that Nebraska had not
sought review of the district court's prohibition of state printing of prayer books).
205. The Lynch majority made this suggestion, 104 S. Ct. at 1365, and it has recently been
repeated by Justice O'Connor, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also Johnson, supra note 167, at 831.
206. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
207. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
208. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
209. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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clause from serving an important role in precluding the state from rein-
forcing that hostility and social ordering.2 1
0
V. TOWARD A TwO-TRACK ANALYSIS OF ESTABLISHMENT CASES
A hallmark of the Burger Court has been its strenuous effort to rein
in federal courts by severely curtailing the circumstances in which plain-
tiffs can raise third-party interests.2 ' In Lynch, the plaintiffs stressed
precisely the individualized injuries that the Court has laid down as the
sole grounds for invoking judicial power-the extent to which they rea-
sonably perceived that the city's display of a religious symbol constituted
official preference for a religion in which they did not believe. Yet the
Court entirely ignored those individual interests. The Court's approach
reveals a serious defect in the usefulness of the Lemon test.212
All establishment clause cases are not alike. Their differences reflect
the differing values which the clause embodies. The reasons courts
should not decide questions of church doctrine in resolving church prop-
erty disputes are incongruent with the reasons the state cannot aid reli-
gious education, and neither set of reasons mirrors the reasons the state
may not require church attendance even if attendance were shown to
reduce drug dependence and out-of-wedlock birth.
The Lemon test is largely a product of its origin in one kind of estab-
lishment clause case, involving state financial aid to sectarian education.
In such cases, the state has a legitimate, secular goal-the improvement
of education-and the principal dispute has been over whether the state
action has had an impermissible side effect of aiding or entangling the
state in religion. In other words, the issue is whether state actions not
aimed at establishment clause interests nonetheless affect such interests
substantially enough to require that the state advance its goals in other
ways. The perspective in the parochiaid cases has not been of dissenters
attacking religious preferences, but rather of taxpayers arguing that the
establishment clause forbids tax support of religious schools, notwith-
standing the secular interests supporting such aid. That perspective
makes sense: such laws generally make aid available to dissenting reli-
gious groups equally with the dominant religious group.
When the government chooses to deploy frankly religious symbols,
however, a different test is required. In such cases, the government in-
tends involvement with religion. The question then is not whether reli-
gion is substantially aided or advanced-it plainly is-but rather whether
this aid is impermissible. The implicated establishment clause value is
not advancement of religion generally, but preference for a particular
210. As the Court has said with regard to racial prejudice, "[t]he Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them." Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984).
211. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975).
212. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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religion. The relevant perspective is not that of a taxpayer complaining
that tax payments are being used to advance religion as against nonreli-
gion. Rather the perspective is that of a dissenter or nonbeliever com-
plaining that the state is preferring a particular religion to his or her
religion or nonbelief, which is correspondingly impaired.
This distinction is analogous to the two-track scheme that Professor
Laurence Tribe uses to explain the Supreme Court's free speech jurispru-
dence. Track one cases involve government actions aimed at communi-
cation, actions which presumptively violate the free speech guarantee.213
Track two cases involve state actions not aimed at communication, but
which nevertheless have adverse effects on it.2 14 Track two cases are sub-
ject to a less stringent form of scrutiny. The Court will uphold these
actions if they do not unduly constrict the flow of information, that is, if
they further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of speech and restrict such speech no more than is essential to fur-
ther that interest.215
A similar scheme can be usefully applied to establishment clause
cases. Track one establishment cases are those involving government ac-
tion which (1) distinguishes on its face between religions or between reli-
gion and nonreligion;216 (2) is neutral on its face yet was motivated by a
distinction between religions or between religion and nonreligion; 217 or
(3) relies on religious values or religious impact to achieve secular
goals.218 In such cases, government action should be presumptively un-
constitutional. To uphold such action the Court must find it necessary to
serve compelling governmental interests, or exempt from that require-
ment for special historical reasons.
Track one review can be illustrated by a recent case involving the
seal of Bernalillo County in New Mexico.219 The seal consists of a large
cross (taking up two-thirds of the seal), with flashes of light streaming
213. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-88 (1978).
214. Id. at 682-88.
215. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
273 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
216. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidating statute which imposed regis-
tration and reporting requirements only upon religious organizations which solicited more than 50%
of their funds from nonmembers) and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating state
constitutional provision which required a belief in God as a test for public office) with Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding school tax deductions where evenhandedly available) and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax benefits because they were evenhandedly
available to charitable groups). For defense and criticism of the view that the establishment clause
bars discrimination against nonreligion, compare L. PFEFFER, supra note 10 with R. CORD, supra
note 72.
217. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting Ten Commandments); Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (anti-evolution statute).
218. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting Ten Commandments); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading and Lord's Prayer in public classrooms); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (official school prayer).
219. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec.
27, 1984), rev'd en banc (Dec. 26, 1985) (both opinions available on LEXIS and copies on file at
University of Illinois Law Review office).
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from it, and the words "Con este venceremos" ("with this we conquer").
The seal is displayed two feet large on the doors of all county police cars,
and a few inches high on the uniforms of all police officers. The Tenth
Circuit panel, relying on Lemon and Lynch, rejected a challenge to the
cross by a non-Christian citizen, reasoning that the purpose of the seal
was secular. All counties need seals and the panel thought Lynch for-
bade consideration of the reaction of the plaintiff and others to the cross
in the seal.22° The panel found that the effect also was secular within the
meaning of Lynch, a reminder of the Catholic background of Spanish
New Mexico.22 Furthermore, no administrative entanglement was
present.222
Examined under the standard proposed here, the Tenth Circuit
panel could not have reached a decision so at odds with the proper func-
tion of the establishment clause. Because the practice on its face pre-
ferred a single religion, the Friedman case would be a track one case and
the practice would be subject to strict scrutiny. Invalidation would have
followed because the state could show no compelling interest to justify
the injury to minority sensibilities.
Cases on track two are fundamentally different. The government
involvement with religion is a by-product of secular activity. Such activ-
ity may violate the establishment clause; the absence of religious purpose
will not save an action if it has the impact on or involvement with reli-
gion that would lead to the harm the framers feared. Track two cases
inescapably require courts to assess and balance legitimate interests on
both sides, and require difficult judgments as to the relative importance
of competing values. Most school aid cases are on track two 223 and the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test, on which these cases have in-
creasingly depended, is precisely the portion of the test which embodies
the sort of balancing and line drawing necessary on track two.
2 2 4
The suggested approach to the establishment clause would not re-
quire wholesale overruling of earlier cases. It would, however, make
more explicit the interest balancing that in fact has taken place. As indi-
cated by the majority opinion in Lynch, the state can defend almost every
involvement with religion on secular grounds. Lemon originally pur-
ported to ignore those interests-if a practice has the "effect" of aiding
220. Id., panel slip op. at 7-8.
221. Id., panel slip op. at 9-10. The dissent complained that the crosses were displayed so prom-
inently by law enforcement officers that they announced a "Christian police." Id., dissent op. at 3
(Logan, J., dissenting).
222. Id., panel slip op. at 11.
223. Some school aid cases may belong on track one when they involve unrestricted aid to a
religious school as a whole. E.g., Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(invalidating "maintenance and repair" grants, tuition reimbursement plans, and income tax benefits
to parents of children in nonpublic schools).
224. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984) (relative importance
of aesthetics versus speech values); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (relative importance of
grand jury disclosure versus reporters' confidentiality). Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (downplaying first amendment interests asserted in light of legitimate governmental interests).
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religion, then it is deemed invalid notwithstanding other considerations.
But in application, Lemon has simply driven these considerations under-
ground. The search for primary religious effect is often the covert bal-
ancing of religious and secular effects; hence the recurrent stress in Lynch
on whether a "religious effect" is "direct and substantial" or "indirect,
remote, and incidental." '225 The Court should candidly appraise the sec-
ular importance, if any, when government deploys religious symbols; it
should not slip that side of the argument into debates over history and
tradition, while continuing to insist that any "primary effect" of advanc-
ing religion is invalid irrespective of countervailing considerations.
A key question, of course, is why the Lynch court permitted the
creche onto Lemon's track two rather than Larson's track one.226 The
majority found Larson's compelling interest test applicable only to "dis-
crimination" between religions, and found itself "unable to see this dis-
play, or any part of it, as discriminatory in the sense contemplated in
Larson."227 The Court observed that the statute invalidated in Larson
made explicit distinctions among different categories of religion, whereas
Pawtucket chose the symbol of one religion without overtly rejecting the
symbols of others in Lynch.228
This distinction is empty. The city's singular display of the creche, a
Christian symbol meaningful only to one religion, and the dominant reli-
gion at that, should have been sufficient. This is "discrimination" in the
dictionary sense of the term: to show a preference for one out of
many. 229 The Court's erroneous perspective resulted in its insistence that
no discrimination existed; the insistence did not arise from an inherent
defect in the two-track approach. By implicitly limiting its inquiry to
whether Pawtucket engaged in overt intentional discrimination, the
Court determined the result before it even began the more precise con-
sideration of the relevant establishment clause values.
The advantage of the Larson test is the mirror side of Lemon's dis-
advantage. The Larson test requires a court to consider the governmen-
tal interest and the establishment clause interests separately. Applied
whenever the government deploys concededly religious symbols to serve
governmental ends, the Larson approach would avoid the strained spec-
tacle of Lynch in which, contrary to experience and record evidence, a
religious symbol is suddenly deemed to have lost its power to induce
religious feeling, disagreement, and alienation.
The Court has perhaps rightly avoided a general compelling interest
225. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364. See Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973). The vagueness of this standard recalls its unpersuasive use in commerce clause litigation
earlier in this century, eg., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1935) (overruled by
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
226. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
227. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13.
228. Id.
229. To "discriminate" is "to make a distinction in favor of or against one person or thing as
compared with others." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 210 (1974).
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test under the establishment clause, perceiving that it would lead too
quickly to the invalidation of practices that raised only marginal church-
state issues. The critical issue in many of the cases, after all, has not been
whether an infringement of interests protected by the establishment
clause was justified, but whether there had been such an infringement at
all.
2 30
In cases of preference like Lynch, however, in which infringement
should be apparent when viewed from the point of view of those whose
religious symbols are not preferred, no reason for such hesitation exists.
Whatever countervailing reasons may exist for nonetheless upholding the
preferences at issue in such cases, there can be little justification for a
constitutional jurisprudence which ignores the interests of those it is in-
tended to protect, stresses the less-than-compelling interests of the domi-
nant majority in overriding minority rights, and, when all is said and
done, fails to distinguish a Christmas creche from a Thanksgiving
turkey.23'
230. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3239 (1985) (striking down a "well-inten-
tioned" federal program providing remedial education to disadvantaged children in New York City).
231. Cf Hochman, A Christmas Story, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1981, at A27, col. 2 (distinguishing
between perception of Thanksgiving as a public holiday and Christmas as a Christian holiday).
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